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''Tastes Great, Less Filling'': The
Law School Clinic and Political
Critique
Robert J. Condlin

This anicle 1 takes up the question of whether the law school clinic is a
necessary or even preferred vehicle for clinical practice instruction, 2 and its
corollary of whether there are more interesting formats, closer in spirit to
the purposes of a university law school, which would serve clinic.al
instruction's objectives as well. Its answers are, respectively, "no. most of the
time" and "yes, most of the time.·· In response to the first question, it argues
that design and resource limitations prevent the typical clinic from
performing important critical functions of legal education. and that for this
reason the clinic will remain relegated to training tasks not considered
important enough over the long run by a university law school. In response
to the second, it recommends an alternative format for practice instruction
which avoids these problems, describes its advantages over the conventional
clinic, and discusses whether the objections typically made to this
alternative are warranted. While principally about format, the article also
articulates a conception of clinical study which is more compatible with
university education than the conception now in place. Many will view this
as a hopeless plan and perhaps they are right. But if we could get our
thinking about clinical education straight, that sense of hopelessness would
disappear.

Roben J. Condlin is Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland Law School.
Skeptical questioning by a law school dean prompted this article, and the author is grateful to
him.
I. The law school clinic has been a subject of discussion in the journals for some time, but I
have not made an effort to incorporate that discussion or locate my position within it. (For
references to and evaluations of some of that literature see Robert ]. Condlin, The Moral
Failure of Clinical Legal Education. in The Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers'
Ethics, ed. David Luban, 339-41 notes 1-22 (Totowa, N.J., 1984} (hereinafter cited as Moral
Failure); and Robert J. Condlin, Socratt:s' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for
Learning in Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 Md. L. Rev. 223, 223-26 notes 2. 3. 5, 6, 279
note 118 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Socrates' New Clothes).
2. Practice instruction is based on materials and experiences generated by student work for live
clients in pending cases. It is to be distinguished, on the one hand, from clinical instruction
generally, which is the study of lawyer skill practices in all of its forms. many of which take
place outside of clinical practice, see note 6 infra, and on the other, from the law school
clinic, which is only one format in which practice instruction occurs. Unless otherwise
indicated or required by context. when I speak of clinical education. clinical study, clinical
instruction, fieldwork or the like, I mean clinical practice instruction.
«:~ 1986 by the Association of American Law Schools. Cite as 35 J. Legal Educ. 45 (1986\.
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Two additional preliminary points should be made. First, few law
teachers, once engaged, are unemotional or uncertain of their views about
clinical instruction, and evaluative commentary, however tentative or
limited, can provoke strong reaction from supporters and detractors alike. A
discussion, therefore, should be perfectly clear about just how controversial
it proposes to be. This article does not plan to question the legitimacy of
clinical instruction per se. Such instruction, properly conceived, has
substantial value and is an essential part of an overall program of law
school education. 3 That view is now widely accepted. While debate about
"ultimate existence" is over, however, difficult questions remain about the
form and content clinical instruction ought to have, and it is those
questions that are taken up here.
Second, discussion is limited to what may be called the conventional
clinic, a law office established and operated by a law school for the purpose
of student clinical practice. Excluded will be discussion of classroom and
simulation-based approaches to clinical study, and fieldwork-based
approaches, such as the clinical internship, or so-called farm-out program,
in which the person responsible for student instruction is not a full-time
member of the law school faculty. The conventional clinic is not the only
format for practice instruction but by clinical teacher consensus it is the
most effective, and it is preferred by most law schools. Schools that choose
not to establish a conventional clinic usually have economic rather that
pedagogic reasons for their decisions. Even in a post-CLEPR age, with the
laudable demise of the "in-house" litmus test, 4 the conventional clinic is
primum inter paria, and a discussion of its strengths and weaknesses is
generally thought to be a discussion of the best that clinical education has to
offer.
The Purpose of Clinical Practice Instruction
Our starting point must be an understanding of what clinical practice
instruction tries to accomplish. Over the years the most popular objectives
have been training in the motor dimensions of lawyer practice skills (skills
training); teaching ethics, both the development of character and informing
about relevant codes and rules (ethics); internalizing the tacit norms and
lore of law practice (socialization); inspecting particular types of lawyer
work prior to job selection (placement); increasing self-awareness of
dispositions and values likely to affect performances as lawyers (selfawareness); teaching doctrine and analysis in an engaging fashion
(pedagogy); and understanding and criticizing standard ways of performing
lawyer practice skills for their contributions, both in specific instances and

3. The author supports this claim in Condlin. Moral Failure, supra note I, at 319-24; and
Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note I, at 227 note 10.
4. See Condlin, Moral Failure, supra note I. at 332-36: and Condlin. Socrates' New Clothes,
supra note I. at 223-24 note 2, for a description of CLEPR, (The Council on Legal
Education for Professional Responsibility). its role in the development of clinical
education. and the ways in which it conditioned both recognition of a rlinical program and
eligibility for financial support on whether the program had convt>ntional properties.
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in the aggregate, to the legal system and the outcomes it produces
(critique). 5 Usually, clinical teachers have favorites among these objectives
and shape their programs to emphasize one or two in a sustained and
systematic way. But this narrowing of focus can create problems if the
teachers choose unwisely, for the objectives exist in a hierarchy, and critique
is at the top. This fact has consequences for all the decisions involved in
constructing a clinical program and in teaching a clinical course. 6
Clinical critique takes as its subject the skill practices (and the theories on
which they are based) lawyers use to give effect to legal rules and is
5. On the objectives of clinical education see generally Anthony Amsterdam, Clinical Legal
Education: A 21st Century Perspective. 34 J. Legal Educ. 612 (1984); Mark \'. Tushnet,
Scenes from the Metropolitan Underground: A Critical Perspective on the Status of
Clinical Education, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 27:~ (1984): Condlin. Moral Failure, supra note
1, at 318-24: FrankS. Bloch, The Andragogic.1l Basis of Clinical Legal Education. 35 \'and.
L. Rev. 321. 322-25 (1982) and articles cited therein; Kenneth R. Kreiling. Clinical
Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning to Learn from Experience
through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision. ·10 Md. L. Rev. 284 (1981 ); Carrie
Menkel·Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Educdtion: Theories about Lawyering, 29 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 555 (1980); David R. Barnhizer. The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its
Theory and Implementation, 30 J. Legal Educ. 67 (1979); john 1\1. Ferren. Goals. Models.
and Prospects for Clinical Legal Education, in Clinical Education and the Law School of
the Future, ed. Edmund W. Kitch, 94 (University of Chicago Law School Conference Series
No. 20, 1969).
6. The conventional clinic is only a small part of the clinical curriculum. An ideal curriculum
would begin with classroom survey courses in lawyer practices based on social science
research data and scholarship about the profession and videotapes of lawyers acting in role.
In analyzing this material students would develop intellectual categories that put practice
experiences into larger context, and develop the \"Oc-abulary necessary to discuss lawyer
behavior with others. See Gary Bellow &: Bea Moulton, The Lawyering Process: Materials
for the C.linical Instruction in Advocacy (Mineola. N.Y .. 1978), for an illustration of the
concepts with which such courses would work. Much of the cognitive instruction now
done in clinics could be removed to this type of course.
Survey courses would be followed by seminars examining selected subparts of the clinical
subject matter in greater depth, in major part through the use of role playing. gaming. and
simulation methodologies. (Interviewing and Counseling, Investigation and Discovery.
and Bargaining and Negotiation are the more common titles and subject matter
subdivisions of. these courses.) Survey and simulation courses would precede clinical
practice and be prerequisites to it, and the conceptual apparatus and beginning motorskills developed in these courses would help students exploit more of the potential of the
real life setting. A sequence of prerequisites also would help minimize the problem of
overgeneralization. Left on their own, students understandably view their first practice
experiences as everyman's and miss the richness of variation that a truly big picture
provides. But if the variation is described in advance the limits of individual experiences
can be noticed or pointed out.
Notwithstanding that it comes last, and that most students will not do it, clinical practice
is an important part of this overall program. Critique presupposes understanding of lawyer
practices, and understanding in turn presupposes some experience with the practices·
operation. This is not a radical view. In fact. a version of it underlies the socratic paradigm
of first year law teaching. First year teachers do not believe that students understand case
analysis after being told, among other things, that it consists of assessing changing fact
patterns to identify legally relevant considerations that matter and distinguish them from
those that do not. It also is thought necessary that students try their hands at assessment and
subject their efforts to a law professor's evaluation. The discussions that ensue are expected
not just to increase skill proficiency at comparing cases (though that is a goal). but to
enhance understanding of relevant legal similarities and differences. Understanding. as
much as skill, is the object of this process. Understanding is not the same as critique.
however, and traditional instruction is often as ddiciem as clinical in failing to take this
next step.
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concerned with understanding and evaluating the manner in which such
practices contribute to the justice of the legal system. 7 These practices are
important because they make up the low-visibility ways in which lawyers
amend, abrogate, and enforce the law, and in the process, determine much
of law's meaning for persons who come in contact with it. 8 The practices are
amenable to theoretical elaboration, support multiple research agendas, and
can be divided, categorized, and sequenced conceptually for purposes of
instruction. 9 In addition, they provide a distinct and relatively unexplored
vantage point on the operation of the legal system from which new critical
insights about law about law may be produced. and these insights in turn
will have implications for the ways in which statutes are drafted and
doctrines elaborated. 10 One can have normative theories about the proper
performance of lawyer practices, and theories about how lawyer practices
contribute to the justice of the legal system as a whole. While clinical
thinking in each of these areas is far from developed, the work to be done is
familiar and manageable. 11 In studying lawyer-skill practices, teachers and
students come to see how the individual actions of lawyers constitute and
reconstitute legal rules, and how the legal system's kantian (rule/policy)
and aristotelian (lawyer dispositional) halves fit together.
Critique consists of analyzing and evaluating the patterns and theories
immanent in the methods lawyers use to perform and think about skill
practices against conceptions of what would be better, for the purpose of
resolving perceived contradictions between theory and practice.J2 This
analysis presupposes a critical theory, which in turn presupposes workedout views on the nature of a fair and just legal system and the role of lawyer

7. These practices can be thought of generically as inquiry, bargaining, persuasion, planning
and so on, or in task specific terms such as interviewing, counseling, negotiation, witness
examination, oral argument and the like. See Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note I,
at 224-25 note 3, for a description of the benefits to be gained from looking at these
practices from each perspective.
8. See e.g., Robert J. Condlin, Cases on Both Sides: Patterns of Argument in Legal Dispute·
Negotiation, 44 Md. L Rev. 65 (1985) (illustrating the ways in which lawyer argument
practices give varying content to the same su6stantive norms in different legal disputes).
See also Gerald R. WiJJiams, Legal Negotiation and Settlement 6-7 (St. Paul, Minn .. 1983)
(variable results reached by differing teams of lawyer negotiators settling the same case);
Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge 202-205 (New York. 1974)
(variable assessments of the legal strength of the same case made by different experts).
9. See Bellow 8: Moulton, supra note 6, for one such conceptualization.
10. See Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note I, at227-28 note 10, for a description of the
contributions of the clinical perspective 10 the study of traditional substantive law
questions. See also Robert H. Mnooldn 8: Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow ur
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale LJ. 950, 977-980 ( 1979) (description of substantive
law insights suggested by the perspective of lawyer bargaining).
II. For examples of the best clinical work of this type to date see infra note 43. For interesting
traditional law teacher contributions to this literature see Walter Probert 8: Louis M.
Brown, Theories and Practices in the Legal Profession, 19 U. Fla. L. Rev. 447 (1966); Irvin
C. Rutter, A Jurisprudence of Lawyer's Operations, 13 J. Legal Educ. 301 (1961).
12. On critique see Raymond Guess, The Idea or a Critical Theory: Habermas 8: Thr Frankrurt
School 55-95 (New Rochelle, 1981). See also Rirhard J. Bernstein, The Restructuring or
Social and Political Thought 173-225 (Philadelphia. 1976!.
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practices in operating and improving it.I3 This theory can be a psychology
of law practice, in which individual lawyer behavior is viewed as relatively
discrete and self-contained action and the principles that explain its
operation are identified and categorized, 14 or a kind of legal sociology (or
economics), in which principles of individual action are replaced by
equivalent principles about legal institutions and systems, and lawyer
behavior is explained by the incentives and constraints of the social matrix
in which it occurs. 15 A psychology or sociology is not critical, however,
until it challenges prevailing conceptions of good behavior and identifies
(even if only implicitly) better ways of thinking about and performing in
lawyer role. To make judgments about what would be better, principles of
individual action and social organization must be linked to a theory of
society or theory of justice, a theory of the way in which lawyers and legal
institutions ought to operate in order that fair and just states of affairs be
produced. 16 These theories can be incomplete, tentative, or not wholly (or

13. I£ critical theory is understood in its strictest sense. as encompassing the critique of ideology
(ldeologiekritik,) this may require too much. In Ideologiekritik the theorizing agent
becomes object as well as subject by including his own behavior, including his own
theorizing, within the ambit of his criticism. /d. The goal is to produce "emancipatory
insight," that which transcends ideological constraints. even those of which the agent is
unaware, in part through dialogic interaction with self-reflective and communicatively
competent subjects. See e.g., Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests 310
(Boston, 1971). For the Hegelian, this activity also may be seen as part of an innate
dialectical drive to absolute knowledge grounded in the idealist presupposition of the
identity of thought and being. See Alan Montefiore &: Charles Taylor, From an Analytical
Perspective, in Garbis Kortian, Metacritique 10 (New York, 1980). At this level. a critical
theory is a theory of criticism as well as a theory of society. Few political philosophers (let
alone law teachers) claim to have a worked out critique of ideology, however, (even more
deny its possibility), and more cannot be expected from persons whose interest in the field
is, of necessity, secondary. So while I do not rule out efforts by clinical teachers at
Ideologiekritik, and some will struggle with this difficult task, see e.g.• Dean H. Rivkin.
Law Reform and the Faces of Power, (unpublished paper) {copy on file with author). for
most a psychology of law practice or a legal sociology, combined with a "practical" theory
of justice, will be sufficient. See Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice 255 (Boston. 1973),
on the nature of "practical" theories; and Sir David Ross. The Nichomachean Ethics of
Aristotle 28-39 (New York. 1975), on "practical" wisdom. See also Bernstein. supra note 12.
at 187-88 (discussion of the difference between practical and technical theories).
14. There are many such psychologies now in clinical use. See e.g.. David A. Binder&: Susan C.
Price, Legal Interviewing and Counseling {St. Paul. Minn .. 1977); Thomas Shaffer, Legal
Interviewing and Counseling in a Nutshell (St. Paul, Minn., 1976); Andrew Watson. Legal
Interviewing and Counseling (Indianapolis, 1976). But see William H. Simon. Homo
Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism. 32 Stan. L. Rev. 487 (1980) {criticizing
the psychological vision underlying clinical study as a new legal formalism).
15. There are only a few clinical sociologies, see e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another
View of Negotiation: The Structure o£ Legal Problem Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 754
(1984), and, to my knowledge, no economics.
16. An illustration will help. Simon's claim that lawyers cannot investigate client ends without
imputing them, and that to impute ends is to impose a structure of professional
domination, is critique. See William H. Simon. The Ideology o£ Advocacy: Procedural
Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 30, 52-59 (1978). It is a socialpsychological claim grounded in a political theory which can say why domination is bad.
(I do not suggest that Simon's claim is correct. just that, i£ correct, it is an illustration of
critique.) Binder and Price's observation. on the other hand. that characteristics o£ lawyer
questioning shape and restrict client responses is not (yet) critique. because it is only a
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even in major part) original, as long as they are also coherent, intelligent,
and genuinely open to further development. Clinical teachers do not have to
be original political thinkers, but they should have a political dimension to
their conception of the clinical subject.J7
Political critique is the most important clinical objective for several
reasons. To begin with, it is the objective most adapted to the university
setting in which legal instruction occurs. Critique is a university's reason
for being, its identifying characteristic, and the only one of its multiple
functions it fails to perform at the price of being a university. Stripped of its
critical role, the university is a mere ·socializing agent, an instrument of
prevailing orthodoxy, engaged only in legitimation and control. One might
be skeptical about the modern university's commitment to critique and this
would be fair. Day-to-day university activity is often mundane; critique is
rare, and socialization and control are commonplace. But critique is the
university's highest function, its aspiration, the source of its greatest
potential and its o<;casional achievement and it remains the strongest basis
of the argument for the university's existence.' 8
The critical task is particularly important to the university law school.
The ability to judge day-to-day law practice against objective standards of

social-psychological claim and cannot, on its own terms, say whether influencing client
responses is good or bad. See Binder & Price, supra note 14, at 40-47. Binder and Price's
analysis has an inchoate political dimension, but until that dimension is developed their
analysis cannot be said to be critical. For some, identifying contradictions between
another's theory (about which one has no position) and practice also counts as critique,
and avoiding inconsistency or self-contradiction is the only necessary substantive norm.
Guess has called this type of criticism "genetic" and found it wanting, in major part
because of its ambivalence about substance. See Guess, supra note 12, at 26-44.
17. Clinicians have traditionally been more interested in social psycholog~ than politics. See
e.g., Menkel-Meadow's analysis of negotiation behavior, in which she makes claims that
seem necessarily grounded in political theory but which are defended almost exclusively in
social-psychological terms. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15. For a beginning analvsis of the
political dimensions of negotiation and bargaining, see Gerald j. Postema, Coordination
and Convention at the Foundations of Law, II J. Legal Studies 165 (1982): David Luban,
Bargaining and Compromise: Recent Work on Negotiation and Informal justice, H Phil.
& Pub. Affairs 397 (1985). Nonclinical teachers are often no better than clinicians at
incorporating political theory, but that is not to say that traditional and clinical teacher~.
as groups. are equally undeveloped. There is a large body ol traditional legal scholarship
drawing on critical social theory (see e.g., relevant excerpts from the following symposia or
symposia facsimile: Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 Stan. L. Rev. I (1984); The Fiss·
Brest Debate on Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739 (1982); Symposium: Law and
Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 (1982): A Symposium: The Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1289 (1982); Symposium on Legal Scholarship, 90 Yale L.j. 955 (1981), and
individual articles, see e.g., Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/ Post modern
Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 291 (1985); joseph William Singer, The Player
and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L.j. I (1984), and this thinking
increasingly is entering mainstream law teaching. In addition, because traditional law
teaching materials (including casebooks) frequently embody critical perspectives, law
teachers using such materials present such views even without trying to. While it would be
better if these efforts were conscious, coherent tacit political analysis is better than none.
18. On the nature of the university, see Charles Wegener, Liberal Education and the Modt•rn
University (Chicago, 1978): joseph j. Schwab, College Curriculum and Student Protest
(Chicago, 1969); Laurence R. Veysey, The Emergence of the American University (Chit-ago,
1965).
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justice and fairness is an essential quality of a good citizen and a good
lawyer. 19 Yet legal work settings make this kind of deliberation difficult.
Lawyer tasks have predefined instrumental ends and lawyer roles come with
a full complement of powerfully felt self-interests, and the combination of
the two often distorts critical thinking and sometimes corrupts it. For most,
law school provides the last unrestricted opportunity to take a larger view,
where "work" itself obliges one to develop a conception of lawyer behavior
that serves more than selfish ends. In an important sense, the obligation to
pursue critique is heightened not diminished by the fact that law school is
the last step on a journey into a profession.
In addition, in the legal system's educational division of labor critique of
lawyer practices is the special domain of the clinical law teacher. Students
learn about law practice from many directions and sources. Expert
practitioners develop skills. law firms sociali:t.e. psychologists increase selfawareness, placement officers find jobs. traditional law professors teach
about doctrine and analysis, and philosophers develop ethical
sophistication. These processes occur in clinics. but good instruction
depends upon both format and expertise. and in most of these subjects
clinical teachers are not expert, at least not in comparison with persons who
work with the subjects full time. For some of these subjects, skills training is
the best example, clinicians are additionally disabled becuase unlike
practitioners, they do not work with students for a long enough period of
time for the instruction to take hold. (Skills are based on habit and habit
takes longer than a semester to develop.) Clinicians have time and
opportunity to analyze lawyer skill practices, however, they can develop the
necessary expertise and they are likely to be the only persons in the students'
educational process concerned principally with this topic. Not to pursue the
subject is to fail to deliver on the clinical teacher's implied promise to teach
about lawyer practices as a critical perspective on law.
Moreover, critique is the foundation on which the other clinical
objectives rest. Even skills training presupposes critical judgments about
what skills ought to be learned. in what order, and in what form, and these
judgments in turn presuppose a conception of a fair and just legal system

19. Most conceptions o£ lawyer role require that a lawyer be a political and moral agent. Even
in Fish's view, where there seems to be the widest latitude (see Interpretation in Law: The
Dworkin-Fish Debate [Or. Soccer amongst the Gahuku-Gama). 73 Calif. L. Rev. 158. 168
[1985]). a lawyer must be capable o£ moral judgments and make them. See Stanley Fish.
Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 495. 501 (1982). For other
conceptions o£ lawyer role representing radically different viewpoints. but all requiring a
lawyer capacity for moral and political judgment. see Monroe H. Freedman. Lawyers and
Ethics in an Adversary System (Indianapolis, 1975); Simon. supra note 16. at 130-44;
Edward A. Dauer&: Arthur Lcff. C".orrespondence: The Lawyer as Friend. 86 Yale L.J. 573.
580-84 (1975); Charles Frird, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation. 85 Yale L.J. 1060 (1975). Perhaps Rov Cohn \oJould not require
such judgments but few have accused Cohn of being a political or moral philosopher. See
e.g., Roy Cohn, A Fool for a Client (New York. 1971 ).
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and the role of lawyer practices in operating and improving it.2° One cannot
say, for example, what kind of rhetorical and strategic maneuvering is
proper in influencing an adversary to settle until one has worked out a
moral and political view about how dispute negotiation ought to proceed.21
For example, we do not call a person who fabricates evidence and obtains a
favorable settlement as a result, skillful; we call him dishonest. And a person
who curses an adverse negotiator because he knows the adversary will be
upset and bargain badly is often thought of as abusive not skillful, even
when the tactic succeeds. The concept of skill has no meaning outside an
ever-changing and controversial normative context and it must be studied in
that context to be understood. Political critique is a necessary not just
interesting part of the study of skill, therefore, and those who fail to engage
in it are forever at the mercy of the prevailing "wisdom" of their
environments and the tacit biases imbedded in their personal beliefs. The
subordination of skills training to critique does not preclude clinical
courses emphasizing skills. But such training ought not to come first, it
ought not to be pervasive, and even when pursued for its own sake it ought
not to ignore altogether the critical background questions temporarily
bracketed.
In suggesting that clinical study ought to engage in critique of lawyer
practices I make no judgments about the ouicome of that critique. Many
standard conceptions of and methods for performing lawyer practices could
be improved,22 but I do not assume at the outset that these conceptions or
methods are corrupt, or that they systematically deny justice to a substantial
part of the legal client population. In fact, I would not be surprised to learn
that, as the end products of a complicated set of necessary trade-offs and
accommodations to practical realities, such practices reflect a kind of
Burkean equilibrium that makes radical reform inadvisable. 23 The opposite
also probably will sometimes be true. My present argument is only that
clinicians ought to determine for themselves the extent to which each such
situation exists.

20. It may be objected that critique also presupposes skill. and that a circle is the appropriate

metaphor to describe the logical relationship between skills training and critique. Further,
if this is true a claim that one process presupposes the other is nothing more than a claim
about where one has broken in on a circle. This objection may be granted without
conceding that critique is still the appropriate place to break in. A sufficiently clever mind
can produce ground breaking analysis of processes not yet mastered, but masterful
performance is rarely possible without a critical if in part inarticulate overview. Critique
also lends itself more easily to self-contained study. A rich critical theory helps answer
many of the questions it raises, but determining what is skillful in even a rudimentary way
is not possible without resort to critical analysis. And, more damage is done in clinical
work, both to clients and self, by students long on natural skill and short on understanding
than by their opposites. Each of these reasons suggests that critique is the place to begin.
21. For a preliminary discussion of this issue see Condlin, supra note 8, at 133-35. See also
William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469,504 (1984)
(even common sense practical judgments and compromises presuppose theories about the
way the society is structured and what it permits).
22. I describe one such set of improvements in Condlin, supra note 8, 126-35.
23. See David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in The Good Lawyer, supra note I, at 11011 (descripuon of a "Burkean" argument).

HeinOnline -- 36 J. Legal Educ. 52 1986

The Clinic and Political Critique

53

In the end, critique of lawyer practices is pursued for its contribution to
the development of the individual-not to be unknowingly captive to
received wisdom is to be more fully autonomous-because it is an essential
element of a law trained person's completed world view, and as a
foundation for reform of the incentive structures within which lawyer
behavior operates. When it is present and done well, clinical instruction is
successful and the simultaneous pursuit of other objectives makes the
instruction that much better, but when it is absent, no amount of training in
motor skill, socialization, or self-awareness can wag the dog. It is the only
element of clinical study that is both a necessary and sufficient condition of
good instruction.2~
II. Two Problems with the Conventional Clinic
Two features of the conventional clinic inhibit effective critique. I shall
discuss the first as a problem of design, and the second as a problem of
resources.

A. Design
The conventional clinic purports to be both law school and law office,
and its supervising attorneys both law teachers and lawyers, who both
produce data and evaluate it. These dimensions cross-pollinate, clinicians
claim, to create in the clinic the best of both worlds, a critical practice and
an informed and relevant critique. Perhaps this is correct and certainly it is
worth exploring, but there are reasons for dividing the labor of lawyering
from the labor of critique that arguments for the conventional clinic do not
take into account.
To begin with, to conceive of a clinical teacher as both lawyer and
professor, or as both data and critic, is to build into the role a conflict of
interest. 25 There is an emotional stake in a personal work product that
makes it difficult to see weaknesses let alone criticize them with others,
particularly when one is viewed as an "expert" and not expected to make
mistakes. In evaluating his own efforts a clinical teacher will pull analytical

24. Making critique the preeminent objective has several practical implications for the manner
in which practice courses are typically thought about and taught. I! is not important for
critique, for example, that students perform lawyer skill practices with great frequency. It is
enough that they see particular practices performed and do them themselves a few times
until the elements and the steps necessary 10 their mastery are evident. At that point. lime is
usually better spent dissecting the practices for their essential properties. comparing them
with alternatives, and evaluating their role in producing just outcomes. The critical
clinical student is more of (though not completely) an anthropologist than a native. He
becomes pan of the lawyer·society, but also maintains enough emotional and intelleClual
distance 10 allow him 10 analyze that society's practices for their political and moral biases.
presuppositions, and effects. He tries to understand why things are done as they are and
enlarge his sense of what could be done, rather than internalize as habit what is commonly
accepted.
25. Il is also 10 define the rc!e as encompassing two full-time jobs, and virtually 10 guarantee
that neither will be performed al the level of excellence. Such a conception programs
clinicians 10 fail. and ought 10 be rejected (especially by clinical teachers) for this if for no
other reason.
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punches, no matter how large his reservoir of earnestness and good will, and
be oblivious to this fact. 26 If I am paternalistic in my relations with clients,
for example, and evidence this by shielding them from unpleasant
information, either by withholding it or presenting it in its "best" (i.e.,
inaccurate) light, but paternalism is not consistent with my image of myself
or my conception of good lawyering, the insight that I am paternalistic is
one I typically would screen out. Either I would not notice the behavior
manifesting this pattern, or I would interpret it as showing concern for the
client. Yet to teach from the behavior I would have to recognize and
acknowledge the paternalism. Otherwise, I would teach about the wrong
issue, and perhaps fail to understand the issue at all.
The negative effect of this screening process on student learning is often
extreme. Not only will clinical teachers miss problematic patterns in their
practice behavior, but they will miss patterns likely to be the most
educationally interesting because they are also likely to be the most
threatening. In an ideal world this would not happen. There, a clinician
would be as critical of his own work as that of others, and most accounts of
clinical study assume this ideal. But experience teaches that this is an
optimistic assumption most of the time because it does not take into account
the finely developed mechanisms all of us possess to shield ourselves from
information about how far we have fallen short. We may listen to such
information under the right conditions, but it is the rare one among us who
is willing or able to be the messenger at the same time.27 This is not
pathological. Defenses are adaptive mechanisms that perform necessary
functions in life. But one thing they do not do is allow one to know oneself
by oneself.
·
To this it might be argued that in the conventional clinic the student's
work is criticized and not the professor's. As a description of what typically
occurs this is no doubt true, but as a claim about what ought to occur it is
not. Practice instruction is the study of lawyer behavior and in this study
student behavior is a small and often not very interesting part. Behavior of
experienced and skilled lawyers, even if only a little more experience and
skilled, must be added to the hopper if the study is to prove comprehensive
and rich, and the supervising attorney's behavior is the logical candidate.2a
Clinical teachers can suppress discussion of their own efforts, of course, and
many do, but at the cost of greatly restricting the scope and sophistication of
their study.
It also is difficult in a clinical setting to separate student from supervisor
work. Student decisions typically are reviewed in advance and students
believe teachers have ratified important strategic choices before actions

26. Ferren, supra note 5, at 118-20.
27. Clinical participams who engage successfully in the critique of ideology (see not<.' 13 supra)
are a limited exception to this claim. This is a small group (if it exists at all), howevt"r, and
even it should participate in the conventional dink only after having mmplelt~d all other
parts of the full clinical sequence.
28. See Condlin, Moral Failure. supra nott• I, at :!22-25. for a discus~ion o£ the importance ol
teacher behavior 10 prartin· instrunion.
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affecting client interests are taken. Students say as much in after-the-fact
discussions if the teacher is critical ("you told me it was all right," or "why
didn't you tell me not to do it"). These are legitimate protests. Protecting
client imerests is more important than allowing students to learn from
mistakes and when student choices jeopardize such interests it is
irresponsible for teachers not to intervene. When teachers are implicated in
even this secondary sense, as all conventional clinicians are. their defenses
are likely to be mobilized and their analytical punches are likely to be
pulled. At a minimum, valuable time will be wasted resolving the not very
important question of whether the teacher said that the choice was all right.
Clinical students should review work in advance-! do not suggest the
opposite-but postperformance analysis is likely to be more probing if the
professor is not already on record (even arguably) as having approved of the
work. 29
Clinical students are not good critics of their professors· work because
students and professors are not true colleagues within the social and
political structure of law school. The two groups have different levels of
experience, status, perspective. and formal authority, and in each of these
categories teachers have the upper hand, and often use it to suppress
nonconforming views. 3° Clinicians sometimes pretend that they are no
different from their students, but this usually appears patronizing or silly,
and is the opposite of what the students bargained for in paying tuition.
When clinicians report that students are effective critics, it is usually because
they (the clinicians) have a unduly narrow sense of what can be said about
their work, or because the student has learned what the professor would like
to hear. 31

29. These problems could possibly be reduced b¥ assigning students to two clinical teachers.
one to supervise skill performance and the other critique, but it is nearly as difficult to
analyze the work of a close colleague as that o£ one's self. Multiple supervisors are also
expensive, particularly in comparison with the outside attorney option described in section
III, and should be avoided when possible £or this reason alone. It is not just that two
salaries cost more than one, but that money spent £or the extra salary will be used to
duplicate something that already exists. In instances where the conventional clinic is the
pedagogical format of choice, dual supervision is preferred. See infra 24-25.
30. See Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note I, at 248-74 (dominant pattern in clinical
supervision is one o£ teacher manipulation and control, even when ostensibly the
opposite). In part, this is because practice instruction typically comes at the beginning
rather than end of a student's clinical study, before he has had an opportunity to develop
coherent views about lawyer practices or a vocabulary within which to discuss those views
with another. A sequence of prerequisites would lessen this problem. See note 6 supra. I
once claimed that the shared law-practice world of the clinic gave students confidence.
knowledge, and critical perspective, and that these in turn increased student scrutiny o£
teacher pronouncement. See Condlin, Moral Failure. supra note I, at 322. I now bt>lieve
that claim to be overstated. See also Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch. 85 Harv.
L. Rev. 392, 412 (1971), for a description of student conversational styles when speaking
with faculty. While many o£ the insights o£ Stone's important article are dated, its analysis
of the student deferential style remains accurate.
31. To establish a truly nonhierarchical relationship, Simon has suggested that it is the
responsibility of a teacher to "create [a student) capable of holding [the teacher]
accountable." See Simon. supra note 21. at -189. (Simon discusses lawver-clit•nt relations,
but the extrapolation to u·acher-student seems fair and is on<' I sus pen he would be willing
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Additionally, when the attorney and professor are one and the same there
is increased pressure to avoid critique. For example, an attorney/professor
often will want to use clients for instructional ends when the needs of the
client conflict, usually in the interest of student education rather than out of
a disrespect for client autonomy. (The opposite problem can occur as well.
A clinician who sees himself more as an attorney than professor may want to
use students to perform routine representational tasks with little or no
instructional benefit.) Thus, he might schedule extra discovery, hearings on
motions, bargaining sessions, or the like so that students can try their hands
at prized but infrequent tasks. Sometimes such procedures benefit clients,
and other times they do not, but they are always costly, even to those who do
not pay their lawyers (e.g., delay, extended uncertainty, unpleasantness),
and the decision of whether the game is worth the candle is for the client to
make based on client considerations. Since the student and attorney;
professor describe the choices that must be made, and provide much of the
information on which such decisions are based, the potential for loading the
deck in the direction of educational ends is high. 32 And because the same
persons are also responsible for detecting self-interested action after the fact,
the likelihood of discovery is low.
Lawyer-client conflicts occur in all practice settings, of course, but they
are particularly pronounced in the monopoly conditions experienced by
most clinics. Poor persons will not want to jeopardize their chance for legal
redress by seeming "uncooperative" or "ungrateful,'' and will be susceptible
to "suggestions" or "hints" that additional work needs to be done. A

to make.) This is eilhc!r the student·and·teacher·are·equivalent view slightly dressed up, or
a conception of expert-layperson relationships that makes conventional hierarchical
thinking look like leveling. On this second and more interesting reading, teachers (or
lawyers) not only are more powerful than students (or clients), they are so much more
powerful that, godlike, they are able, even obliged, to "create" students in their own image
and likeness. Yet, from the students' perspective. if il is difficult to deal with the
conventional authoritarian bureaucrat, think of how much more difficult il would be to
deal with God, or for that matter anyone unilaterally responsible for creating the
possibility of my bilateral participation. This may read too much into Simon's view, but I
doubt it. Few people are as facile with words as Simon. or choose them as carefully, and the
religious perspective is consistent with his overall orientation. (See Simon, supra note 21, at
506.) Surprisingly Simon seems to think of his approach as egalitarian, and one in which
law teachers (or lawyers) will not dominate. Like other Critical Legal Theorists (see e.g.,
Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic against
the System [Cambridge, Mass .• 1983]), Simon seems phobic about hierarchies. and acts as i£
the overriding goal in life was to stamp them out. Since hierarchies have a nasty habit of
not going away, this causes him to produce fanciful mystifications about the absence of
hierarchy as a prelude to its reintroduction under the guise of nonhierarchy. (How is it
possible, for example, even to describe a nonhierarchical relationship from the perspective
of only one person. as Simon tries to do, particularly the person already dominant.) There
are oppressive hierarchies in life and they should be destroyed, but to acknowledge this is
not to say that hierarchy itself must go. Some hierarchies, both natural and artificially
constructed, produce more benefits than costs and ought to be retained. In the end, the
abuse of hierarchy, not its existence, is the problem in life, and practical suggestions about
keeping hierarchy in check are needed from thinkers as thoughtful as Simon.
32. For an illustration of the low visibility and indirect manner in which a clinical mulrm,
with the best of intentions. can load the deck in favor of student ends. see Condlin. Sorratt•s"
New Clothes, supra note 1, at276-77 note 12.

HeinOnline -- 36 J. Legal Educ. 56 1986

The Clinic and Political Critique

57

genuine desire to avoid controlling the choice on the part of the clinician
does not make this risk any less real. In fact, because his motives are noble he
may be less likely to be on special guard to detect self-interested action,
though no less likely to engage in it, or to have interests different from those
of his client.33 And a clinic, because it is large and relatively undisciplined,
may be less able to monitor closely all the interactions in which such
problems are likely to arise. This is a variation on a familiar point,
discussed in the early clinical literature as the conflict between service and
education, and dismissed there by the assertion that work generated for
educational purposes invariably improved the quality of the client's
representation.34 The argument was powerful at the time because the way in
which clinical practitioner interests could differ from those of their clients
or clients could wish to avoid procedures that provided instrumental
benefits was not widely apparent. Now it is evident that the argument is too
simple.
This conflict between service and education is exacerbated by limitations
of time. In even a moderately busy clinic, preparation of client cases must
receive the highest priority, looked at from the perspective of both lawyer
and teacher (because giving client interests the highest priority is itself an
important teaching message), and preparing cases thoroughly, as a law
school clinic should, will expand to fill the available time. This priority is
reflected in all aspects of the clinic's operation, but is perhaps most
apparent in the patterns that appear in conversations between teachers and
students. Most of these conversations consist of requests by students for
information to fill gaps in their experience, or to help them make strategic
judgments in their cases (what do I do next? where do I find a form for
that?), and clinical teacher responses that answer these requests. The
underlying assumptions are that there are set ways, known to experts, of
performing lawyer tasks, and that a novice's best course is to ask an expert
about them. Since few clinical teachers espouse these assumptions, it is
ironic that in answering student questions they convey the opposite
message. 35 Other discussion, often sophisticated, is about the manipulation
of rules, procedures, and institutions for the purpo.se of gaining an
instrumental advantage against an adversary. This "ends-means" thinking,
as Anthony Amsterdam calls it, 36 like any puzzle-solving, 37 can be
complicated and challenging, but it need not be critical political thinking,
and usually it is not. The assumption in "puzzle solving" is that the

33.Id.
34. See e.g., Earl Johnson, Education versus Service: Three Variations on the Theme. in
Clinical Education for the Law Student 414, 417-20 (Council on Legal Education £or
Professional Responsibility, New York. 1973).
35. See Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note I, at 248-74. £or a description o£ the manner
in which patterns in teacher behavior convey instructional messages often at odds with the
teacher's espoused theory.
36. See Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 614.
37. See Thomas S. Kuhn. The Structure o£ Scientific Revolutions 35-42 (Chicago. 1970), £or a
discussion of "puzzle solving."
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structure of the puzzle is legitimate, so much so that awareness of the
underlying question of legitimacy recedes into unconsciousness.
The foregoing is what one would expect of law office conversation. It is
reasonable for students. as novices, to be preoccupied with impending
instrumental tasks, particularly if client interests are at stake, the tasks are
unfamiliar, and the students' role is defined as performing them
successfully. The first objective in any environment is survival (though
students do not always appreciate that this represents relative rather than
absolute success). And it is only slightly less understandable that clinicians,
as supervising lawyers, would answer student questions to prevent client
interests from being sacrificed, office resources from being wasted, and
student effort from coming to a standstill. This illustrates not so much the
failure of individual clinical teachers and students as the inadequacy of the
metaphor of the teaching law office. Law offices represent rather than teach,
and when they try to do both it is the teaching that suffers, as it should.
Clinical participants will usually be satisfied with using legal rules and
institutions cleverly on behalf of disadvantaged groups (a good thing in
itself), and accept rather than criticize the premises of the system they so
skillfully manipulate. 38 In a world where real client interests are in
jeopardy, obligations are numerous and pressing, and time is limited,
understanding for understanding's sake will not be given a high priority,
and reasonably so. 39 In such a world questions about the justice of
individual outcomes will sometimes be examined, though often only
implicitly, but questions about the justice of systemic or institutional
arrangements or standard practice methodologies will usually go begging.
Ends-means thinking makes it difficult to see the forest for the trees and
undercuts a lawyer's capacity for utopian thinking, an attribute one
ordinarily would think desirable in a social engineer. 40
The conflict-of-interest problem is built deeply into the structure of the
conventional clinic. It is not a cosmetic defect or a failure of execution, and
it is not going to go away on its own as clinics and clinicians mature. If
anything, it will become more serious as clinical practice slips into the
routinized patterns of day-to-day law practice generally, as it has in many

38. See Walter Gellhom, Preaching That Old Time Religion, 63 Va. L. Rev. 175, 187 (1977)
(clinical teachers devoted to sharpening the adversary fang and claw); Charles R. Halpern&:
John M. Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public Interest Law, 59 Geo. L.J. 1095,
1109 (1971) (public interest lawyers, while they otherwise test the law's bounds, profess a
basic commitment "to the adversary system itself.")
39. The problem may be more serious than lack of time. Lawyer thinking differs radically from
critical reflection. It starts from a narrower focus, looks at evidence from a more
instrumental perspective, and is more manipulative in the manner it thinks of and
expresses its conclusions. In a sense. legal and critical thinking are the work of different
people, and a shift from one perspective to the other is a shift in personas. Most of us do not
embody two such equally developed personas, and as a result, would find such a shift
difficult to make.
40. See Robert Gordon, Of Law and the River, and Of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J.
Legal Educ. I, 8 (1985), where he faults minimalist stoic morality (professionalism) for not
dealing with the "real world" of law practice because it gives no guidance on what lawyers
ought to do; it cannot imagine alternatives to the status quo and does not think it should.
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places. Even exceptionally able teachers, who are genuinely interested -in
critique, will find it difficult to pursue that process in such an environment
and this brings us to the second problem. A disproportionate number of
clinical teachers seem uninterested in critique, so much so that even if the
problem of design were corrected, critique would not necessarily become the
central objective of the conventional clinic. This is the problem of resources .

•

B. Resources
Clinical teachers see>m to view prevailing methods for performing lawyer
practices as received wisdom rather than data. and measure success more by
how students imitate these Im!thods than by how they analyze them. This is
evident, not just in the design of the clinic. where clinicians have created a
world in which critique is almost impossible. but in the absence of critical
interests manifest in the scholarly clinical literature. Most clinical articles
describe how students learn that practicing law requires skills beyond being
able to read a case closely, and different examples are given:11 This is not a
startling discovery, however, and it is made with equal facility by students
who have not had the benefit of a clinical course. A second category of
articles, often interesting and clever. catalogues and refines lawyer tactical
tricks. 42 But these articles consist of "puzzle solving," and do not so much
establish the critical dimension as presume it. There are a few critical
clinical articles, 43 but they comprise a regrettably small group that seems
more an aberration th.an a harbinger of things to come.

41. See e.g., William Pincus. The Clinical Component in University Professional Education. in
Clinical Education for the Law Student, ed. William Pincus, 139-51 (New York. 1980).
42. See e.g., Michael Meltsner &: Philip G. Schrag, Public Interest Advocacy: Materials for
Clinical Legal Education ch. 13 (Boston. 1974): Mark K. Schoenfeld. Strategies and
Techniques for Successful Negotiation, 69 A.B.A. J. 1226 (1983).
43. Such articles include Carrie Menkel-Meadow's Problem Solving Negotiation, challenging
prevailing adversarial conceptions of lawyer bargaining (see Menkel-Meadow. supra note
15); Simon's Homo Psychologicus, detailing the lack of a politics in the psychological
vision of lawyering underlying clinical education (see Simon. supra note 14): Bellow's
discussion of paternalism, lack of imagination, and lawyer self-interest imbedded in legal
services offices' standardized methods of representing the poor (see Gary Bellow, Turning
Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience. 34 NLADA Briefcase 106 (1977); and
Schrag's, Bleak House, describing abusive uses of the civil discovery process by the
collection industry (see Philip G. Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer Test
Litigation, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 115 (1969). (See also Tushnet, supra note 5. at 278. and
articles cited therein at notes 12-15.) This group of articles has produced surprisingly little
discussion by clinical teachers. A few nonclinical teachers have joined issue (see e.g.. james
R. Elkins, All My Friends are Becoming Strangers: The Psychological Perspective in Legal
Education, 84 W. Va. L. Rev. 161 ( 1981) replying to Simon): but these are clinical subjects
and one would expect clinical teachers to have important contributions to make. Simon's
strong accusations, at a minimum. should have provoked a reply and a debate clarifving
whether clinical instruction has a politics, but this has not happened. (But see MenkelMeadow, supra note 5, at 565 note 61. clinical teacher response to Simon in a footnote.)
Some will see this a~sessment as overly pessimistic. They believe that clinical scholarship
has begun to mature. or more accurately, has "passed beyond infancy into adolescence."
See, Call for Papers, Brochure of International Conference on Exploring and Expanding
the Content of Clinical Legal Education and Scholarship. Fall 1985 (U.C.L.A. and
University of Warwick Schools of Law). If this was intended as a compliment (twenty years
is a long infancy), and there is every reason to believe that it was. the written record as yet
does not support it.
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Some might argue that the criticisms of substantive law implicit in
clinical education's decision to represent poor people, and explicit in legal
arguments made in briefs and memoranda filed in particular cases, fulfill
the obligation of critique. But beyond the fact that most brief writing is not
critique, 44 this claim fails because clinical teachers were not hired as
commentators on substantive social welfare law schemes. Their subject was
thought to be lawyer practices (if one thought about it), and ultimatel'y, they
were expected to ask whether existing methods for performing such
practices produce more or less justice. The substance/procedure distinction
ultimately collapses, and some substantive law criticism is an inevitable
outgrowth of clinical study. But using lawyer practices for underrepresented groups is not the same as analyzing those practices for their
contribution to a just legal system, or conceiving of better ways to structure
that system, and only the latter are the sine qua non of clinical study.
There is a second, contingen~ dimension to the resource problem, one
grounded ironically in clinical teachers' own mistaken premises. If skills
training (rather than critique) is viewed as the preeminent clinical objective,
most existing programs would still fail, this time because clinical teachers
are not typically the best exemplars of law practice skills. 45 Medical

. One hesitates to raise the problem of the lack of critical clinical scholarship. It is not a
cordial point, some even think it is an impolite one, and such points have a way of being
ignored irrespective of their merits. But there is not much critical clinical literature and this
is a serious cause for concern. One looks in vain at the history of legal education for a
successful reform not grounded principally in a revisionist theory about law, legal systems.
or institutions. Reform of education is first and foremost reform of ways of thinking about
subject matter, manifest in scholarship. Changes in methods of instruction are cosmetic not
substantive, based more on aesthetic than political concerns, and usually only as viable as
the power of the group instituting them is strong. Such changes rarely survive their
sponsors, or their sponsors' current interests. Like reformers before them, from the law-as·
science advocates of the late nineteenth century, to the critical legal studies theorists of the
late twentieth, clinical teachers must say something new, in print, about the fairness,
legitimacy, and nature of law and the legal system. The special vantage point of lawyer
practices makes this possible, but does not guarantee that it will happen.
44. A few clinical teachers argue that briefs should count as critical scholarly output, but this
claim is based on a misunderstanding of critical scholarship. But see Tushnet, supra note 5,
at 277 note II ("Legal briefs are not, by definition, inadequate evidence of scholarly
insight"; (emphasis added). Critical scholarship does not start from the perspective of a
client's instrumental ends, articulate only arguments supporting those ends (and rebuttals
to counterarguments necessary to establish credibility), or try to camou!lage its biases,
weaknesses and strategic omissions rhetorically by the use of argumentative technique.
Some scholars work in this way, but their work is thought to be suspect for those reasons.
By the time a scholar writes he usually knows how he will conclude, but he did not start
with this knowledge in hand, and his views will have changed many times over before
reaching reflective equilibrium. The key difference between the two processes is that in
critical scholarship the author decides for himself the outcome of the analysis; in brief
writing he does not. Brief writing often contributes new insights to the understanding of a
problem, such is the force of self-interested and narrowly focused thought, but rarely if ever
does it alter basic c-onceptions of the way in which the problem should be understood.
45. While it is difficult to establish the best skill exemplars, it is fair to say that as a group
clinical teachers (1) were not the best performers in law school, (2) are young and
inexperienced in comparison with the bar as a whole, (3) do not work in elite law firms or
with anything approximating such firms' facilities or resources, and (4) because they work
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clinicians are a good analogy. They are elite practitioners, at the top of their
fields, and their appointments as clinicians acknowledge this stature rather
than auempt to confer it. Although clinical work does not always have the
highest status, in medicine only the best practitioners become clinicians. If
clinical skills are to be learned by imitation, the medical view seems to hold,
those being imitated should exemplify the best skill performance the
profession has to offer. One would expect law schools to use equivalent
exemplars, experienced lawyers who have established themselves as
foremost among their peers at the ;)erformance of lawyer skills. Yet, few
legal clinicians are elite practitioners or in any other way the equivalent in
stature, competence, or sophistication of their medical counterparts.
Clinical teachers counter that while not always the best at using lawyer
skills they are the best at teaching about (i.e., transmitting) them: that they
make up· in pedagogical effectiveness what they lack in experience and
proficiency.~ 6 This argument has initial appeal. but in the end it concedes
too much. If a clinician has not performed the skills under study at or near
the highest levels, he cannot transmit any interesting understanding of
those skills. This is the premise of clinical education. that experience is a
necessary component of understanding. He may transmit what he
understands well, but this will provide only a misleadingly simple
conception of the skill, and may unwittingly convince students that there is
no more to be learned. A similar lack of experience does not disable a
clinician interested in critique b~cause he does not seek to transmit skills
and thus need not have mastered them. In fact, his critical bite is often
sharper when he is "inexperienced" with the skills and thus not fully
socialized into prevailing practices and modes of thought.
Neither variation of the problem of resources is likely to go away. Elite
practitioners will not become clinical teachers because it would cost them

with novices on relatively simple cases (usually by pedagogical choice) are not likely to be
on the frontiers of new skill developments. There are exceptions to each of these
generalizations, and good arguments that the criteria implicit in them do not measure skill
proficiency accurately. But for most law trained people who do not start out determined to
believe the opposite, I suspect that the above factors establish a fairly powerful
circumstantial case against the claim that clinical teachers are the best skill exemplars. For
attempts at the difCicult task of rank ordering ("stratifying·· would be their word) the bar.
see John Heinz & Edward 0. Laumann. Chicago Lawyers: The Social Stnu:ture of the Bar
(New York, 1982): Francis Kahn Zemans & Victor Rosenblum, The Making of a Public
Profession (Chicago, 1978).
46. If clinicians are willing to sus pen.~ the "experience.. requiremem for themselves in this one
instance. why not for other people in other instances? Why not agree that a person with no
experience. either with the skills in question or law practice in general. who is suHiciently
smart and asks interesting questions, can be as good a clinical teacher as one who has
mastered the skills in their most sophisticated variations? For example, why not Roberto
Unger in the clinic? On this article's view such an idea makes 3cnse, but to accept it. even in
part, is to reject conventional clinical thinking. One would think that clinical teachers
would be eager to give up the no-win claim to skill expertise. Most smdcnts understa11d
from summer and part-time work that clinicians are not the best practitiom•rs. and
traditional faculty do not believe that law teachers who ground their imellcctual authoritv
on skill expertise arc thoughtful. Even as a strategic matter. it is hard to imagine why
clinicians would cling to such a position.
Journal ol Legal Educahon Vol. 36, No.1-3
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too much. They will not view the opportunity to do research and produce
scholarship as a form of compensation. Nor will they, as do their medical
counterparts, be able to generate large fees on the basis of their clinical
work. They will want to be compensated within the salary structure of the
bar, however, and this means larger salaries than law schools are capable of
paying. Moreover, existing clinical teachers are not likely to shift their
emphasis from training to critique because they do not want to. and might
find it difficult to do so if they did. If critique was their highest value
clinicians would have behaved differently from the start. They would have
developed the intellectual content of the clinical subject in the journals,
provided additional room in the structure of the conventional clinic for
reflection on policy questions only tangentially related to skills or the
instrumental tasks of particular cases, and would not have used fieldwork to
carry the brunt of clinical instruction. In addition, having established the
clinic as a practicing law office, clinicians have now created legitimate
expectations in client groups (or at least sincerely and reasonably believe
that they have), that cannot be repudiated unilaterally or easily, either in the
short run to redesign programs or permanently to devote more attention to
questions of critique.
The conventional clinic is often described by students as a haven from the
harsh world of law practice, where one gets a last chance to live according to
ideals. This view (i.e., that ideals play no part in traditional law practice) is
arrogant, coming from persons with little or no experience with practice in
the conventional sense, and dangerous (because it reflects a resignation to
the mundane yet changeable features of regular law practice which must
eventually be confronted). But most important, even if correct, it is a
questionable premise on which to base an educational program. The safehaven concept was tested in the T-group-an experiment of organizational
psychology to help managers learn to produce more open organizationswith mixed and short-lived results. Laboratory training, as it was also
known, developed skill at behaving competently in laboratories, but was
not so successful at transferring learning "back home" to work. 47 Law
schools should think carefully before they replicate this result by
resuscitating the T-group and making it a permanent part of the law school
curriculum.
Students should learn about lawyer practices, to be sure, but in a setting
that represents the one in which those practices are typically carried on.

47. See Fritz Steele. Consulting for Organizational Change 60-82 (Amherst, Mass., 1975)
(characteristics and limitations of laboratory training); Donald N. Michael, On Learning
to Plan-And Planning to Learn 225-64 (San Francisco, 1973) (description of structural
features of conventional social organizations, not present in T·groups that resist learning);
William R. Torbert. Learning from Experience toward Consciousness 45, 166 (New York,
1972) (limitations ofT-group learning); Chris Argyris, Intervention Theory and Method: A
Behavioral Science View 52-55 (Reading, Mass., 1970) (individuals learn to be competent in
T-groups but not to create more open and trusting worlds "back home" in work); Leland
P. Bradford, jack R. Gibb & Kenneth D. Benne, T-group Theory and Laboratory Method:
Innovation in Re-education (New York, I964) (enthusiastic description of the potential of
the T-group learning).
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This means existing law offices and not hybrid variations specially created
for the occasion. Protection against being overwhelmed by the vocationalism
of the law office milieu or its concomitant pressure to turn intellectual
analysis platitudinous or instrumental should come from a law professor
who intervenes when these dangers threaten. Trustworthy data about
student performance48 and access to mentors with critical agendas are the
only essential features of good practice instruction, and most of the time
these will be easier to produce in a format other than the conventional
clinic. 49
III. The Cooperating Outside Office Alternative
Practice instruction could be based in cooperating local law offices of all
types both public and private,so without any loss and potentially some gain
in intellectual sophistication and critical perspective. A student would work
on cases or projects pending in an outside office and in every respect fit into
the office's customary ways of doing things. He would take his primary skill
direction from an outside attorney, whose principal concern would be with
the technical quality of the student's work. The attorney would assign tasks.
edit written work, enforce deadlines, evaluate skill performances. and
otherwise be the final supervisory authority with respect to all efforts on
behalf of the client. In addition to his supervision by the outside· attorney.
the student also would meet with a clinical professor in a regular!!·
scheduled tutorial to discuss the policy questions implicit in the student's
practice. Tutorials make it easier than seminar meetings to preserve client

48. The most common example is a transcript of the relevant portions nl an audio-tape:
recording of the performance under study. A text is important. Analning pc:rlonnamt• on
the basis of shared memory or oral reconstructions is roughly akin to analyzing donrinc: on
the basis of eyewitness accounts of a reading of a judicial opinion. It rnay be possible. but
no one would ever try to do it.
49. Some students inevitably will work for Jaw firms in which skills training is poor or
nonexistent. and law schools are right to be worried about this. But it does not follow that a
clinical course is the place to remedy this problem. More informed placement counseling
and better continuing legal education programs are more logic-.1l responses. A school
should define a clinical course's purposes positively in terms of what it can add to a
studenfs critical understanding of the legal system. rather than reactively in response to
worst-case scenarios about new-lawyer work experiences. A course must have educational
integrity. and for clinical courses that integrity is found in a critical appraisal of lawvc:r
practices and the relationship of those practices to justice.
Additionally, some argue that law schools ought to run clinics as state-of-the-an law firms
where students work with the latest technology and are introduced to up to date theorit·~ of
law oHice management. Most schools could not aHord to do this. and if thev could tht•v
should not want to. Concern with technology and management is at otKt'rtl with form O\'t·r
substance. The interesting things about law practice are legal not technological. and a law
professor's most important contribution to a studenfs learning is in the realm of ideas
about law. Technology and management can be interesting adjuncts to that studv. but tht•v
cannot replace it.
50. These could include private law firms. legal services nHices. public interest organiLations.
legislative and municipal law departments. attorneys-general o£fices. administrati\·c:
agencies. courts. or any other type of oHice engaged in legal work about which a ( linical
program could want to teach. I have used the outside oHice format. as described here. for
several years in my own clinical teaching, and the following discussion is based on that
experience.
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confidences,st and can be held at fixed times because the professor and
students are not tied to the schedule of the clients' cases.
An example will help illustrate the differences between the attorney and
professor supervisory agendas. 52 Assume that a student encounters the
following problem:53 A landlord has started eviction proceedings against a
client of the student's firm for damaging a rental premises. One of the items
of damage is a broken front door window. The client tells the student that
he knows a passerby threw a snowball through the window because he
found a puddle of water in the front hall next to the broken glass. The
student is suspicious because it has not snowed in the vicinity yet that year
(it is November and the interview takes place in southern New England).
Assume also that the client is unfriendly, equivocating, and generally
reluctant to talk. The student believes, not implausibly, that the client broke
the window himself and is lying about the snowball to cover this up.
Possibly being lied to makes the student angry because he believes that it
shows him little respect, and fearful because he thinks it will make him look
like a novice when he presents the story to a supervisor. He brings these and
other issues to his meetings with both the outside attorney and the clinical
professor.
The attorney would be interested principally in obtaining information
necessary to put the client's story in its best light as a defense, or, if the
evidence did not warrant a defense, to persuade the client to concede on the
issue of the broken window. As a first step, he would probably identify
maneuvers that could be used to test the client's story. These might include
obtaining factual information from sources independent of the client that
would make the story more or less plausible (e.g., local weather bureau
snowfall and temperature records); informing the client of the attorneyclient privilege and assuring him that incriminating information would not
be revealed without consent; restating the story,pointing out problematic
areas, and asking the client for further explanation or proof; crossexamining the client to demonstrate how the story might be shown in court
to be implausible; accusing the client of lying and demanding that he deal
honestly; or whatever else came to mind. Testing the story without
rupturing the attorney-client relationship would be a difficult task, calling
for intellectual inventiveness and practical expertise, but a task the student
must learn to perform.
The clinical professor would have a different yet complementary set of
objectives. These might include exploring out-of-the-ordinary instrumental

51. See Confidential Communications in Student Legal Clinics, 1972 Law &: Social Order 668
(1972) (description of the difficulties in preserving client confidences in law school clinics).
52. For an illustration of the differences between thinking like a lawyer and thinking like a
critic, see Jon 0. Newmfln. Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94
Yale LJ. 1643 (1985). Judge Newman's suggestions are the type of ideas which critically
inclined clinicals could be expected to generate and test. Yet a reading of his proposals will
show just how sharply they contrast with the typical clinician's substantive agenda.
53. This example is real and comes from my own clinical supervision, but its generic features
are so commonplace that any clinical teacher could offer an equivalent substitute. Several
have told me that they have supervised the same case.
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resolutions to the problem which had not occurred to the attorney or had
occurred and seemed unpromising;s• or what is more likely, using the
client's behavior as a vehicle for examining the epistemological and moral
difficulties inherent in the process of reconstructing historical fact in
adversarial adjudication. For example, the professor might probe the
concept of "lying" to determine whether it explains all of the client's
actions or the student's worries; question whether structural features of the
attorney-client relationship encourage or provoke such behavior; ask what
obligations a lawyer owes to one who has not communicated events
accurately; try to define the nature of truth telling in a system of stylized
discourse or lying games; consider whether tactics for "testing" the story
raise new problems, such as invasion of client privacy or lack of respect for
client autonomy; examine the role a harsh law, sympathetic client, or
hostile adversary plays in determining what to do; ask how else facts could
be investigated and presented in dispute settlement so as to reduce the
pressure for creating a "best light" story; or take up related questions. 5 5 The
professor's inquiries might produce benefits for the client, but the decision
to undertake them would not depend upon the guarantee of such a return
nor would it ordinarily be expected. Both attorney and professor would take
an agent-centered approach, in that each would attempt to develop
understanding useful to the student while acting in lawyer role. The
attorney would be interested in immediate returns, however, while the
professor would take the longer view.
It is easy to give other illustrations. Assume, for example, that a student
participates in a negotiation in which an adverse attorney exploits his (the
student's) low level of tolerance for conflict. The adversary makes ad
hominem arguments, shouts, threatens, and otherwise abuses the student
because he judges that the student will seek to end the confrontation more
quickly ~md pay client money to do so (i.e., the student will flee rather than
fight). Assume also, that with all of its costs both immediate and longrange, on balance thjs is still the attorney's instrumentally best approach. It
will achieve the highest dollar settlement, in the shortest period of time,
with the smallest amount of expense, and with few if any long-range
repercussions because the attorney will not negotiate with the student again.
A supervising attorney would be interested in what the student could have
done to prevent himself from being abused, while a professor might take up
such questions as whether a settlement based on nonsubstantive
considerations is politically legitimate or whether there are moral limits on
the uses of leverage.
54. See e.g., Saul W. Baerstein, Functional Relations between L"lw and Psychiatry-A Study of
Characteristics Inherent in Professional Interaction. 23 J. Legal Educ. 399 (1971)
(description of a psychiatric remedy to an ostensibly legal problem).
55. These questions are eclectic in their intellectual perspectives and are meant only to suggest
the range of critical avenues open to the clinician, not identify the precise questions that
should be asked. For an illustration of a set of multiple questions, generated from a single
analytical framework, that would be interesting to pursue in this context. see James B.
White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Lift•. 52 l 1•
Chi. L. R(•V. 684. 701-702 (1985).
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Issues raised by the professor also will come up in attorney-student
discussions, but because they are not closely connected with preparing the
client's case thev are likely to be kept in the background. 56 The attorney and
student might refer to the issues in passing, but the professor and student
would_examine them in depth. The professor would suggest readings 57 and
the student would prepare texts (e.g., in the "snowball" case a transcript of
the interview segment in which the student elicited the questionable parts of
the story)58 on which analysis could be based, and these materials wou!d be
distributed sufficiently in advance of a tutorial meeting to allow time for
reflection and judgment. Since it would not be possible to investigate all
important issues in such detail. represemative examples embodying
recurring themes would be chosen. In the outside office format the attorney
and professor complement one another in their approaches to the student's
supervision. and together help the studem discover how instrumental and
critical perspectives intertwine to make a complete frame of reference.
One might ask why fieldwork is essential to the student-professor
discussions. Could not the same analysis be done in the classroom, perhaps
in a more sophisticated fashion, based on social science research data and
scholarship about the profession? If one is interested in lawyer behavior in
the aggregate, a sociology of the profession, then perhaps the answer is yes.
Though even here there is benefit in discovering how patterns that are
problematic in statistical aggregates or verbal descriptions do not always
appear so when confronted in experience. But if one is interested in a moral
philosophy of lawyering it is necessary to deal with these questions in the
first person. Moral understanding is arrived at by critical reflection on

56. This could be for personal as well as work concerns. The professor's questions may

challenge the attorney's conception of role or his standard methods of performing lawyer
tasks. The attorney is likely to filter out such interpretations because they are distracting
under the best of conditions and threatening under the worst. The professor's t•mmional
distance from the representation, and his critical rather than instrumental approat h to the
interview, on the other hand, should increase the likelihood that these possibilities an•
considered.
57. In the "snowball" case these might include excerpts from Sissda Bok. Lying: Moral Choiu•
in Public and Private LiCe (New York. 1978) (discussion o£ diCCiculties in dl'fining lying,
particularly in stylized and role regulated relationships); Stuart Hampshire, cd.. Public and
Private Morality (New York, 1978) (suggestion of argumem for lawyt·r control of diems,
based on analogy to ends-focused morality of public oCCicials); john H. Langbein,
Comparative Criminal Procedure (St. Paul, Minn., 1977) (description of alternative system5
Cor reconstructing historical fact in dispute adjudication): Robert Traver. Anatom\' of a
:\Iurder (New York, 1958) (illustration of the force of lawyer behavior in influencing diem
communication); Luban, supra note 23 (criticism of fan reronstruction pron.•ss in
adversary adjudication); Gerald j. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics,
55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 63 (1980) (discussion of psychological diCCiculties created by behaving
diCCeremly in professional and ordinary relationships); Simon, supra note 16 (proposed
nonhierarchical conception of lawyer-client relatiomhip); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search
Cor Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1975) (discussion of proposed
ethical rule requiring lawyers to pursue truth in adversary adjudication); Ric-hard
Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Problems. 5 Hum. Rts. I ( 1975)
(description of dominating and manipulative patterns in lawyer behavior with dit•nts ami
analysi~ of moral propriety o£ such patterns), and tlw like.
5R. A tt•xt b imponam. Se~ notl' ·18 supra.
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activities that have been experienced pre-reflectively and begun to be
internalized as dispositions. Until disposition is present, at least in some
minimal or beginning form, the moral character of action cannot be fully
understood. Without the experience of acting in lawyer role moral
philosophizing will be just so many words. 59
In addition, just as an anthropologist discovers aspects of a culture lost on
a demographer, a clinical participant discovers aspects of lawyer behavior
lost on a classroom observer. In participating in an event one discovers what
drives it, and this is different from learning how to desGrib~ the event, even
with a great deal of particularity. The professor's questions would have
been asked in other law school courses. but for most students direct
experience will add nuance and sophistication; and for some it will make
the questions real for the first time. A lie is a more complicated
phenomenon in person than in a hypothetical case, and the experience of
perhaps being lied to stimulates additional insight into the nature and
causes of such activity. It is often inconceivable to students that a
misrepresentation could not be a lie, for example, or that someone they were
trying to help could misrepresent to them, that they could unknowingly and
with the best of intentions lead a client to misrepresent, that strong personal
feelings could affect their level of effort, or that they would not probe deeply
to discover truth if it would jeopardize other strategic objectives. Until they
are involved in such events, students do not take seriously the possibility
that the events could happ~n. or become aware of all the factors involved in
understanding and dealing with them.
Direct experience with lawyer role also causes practice instruction to take
a firmer hold. This is not only because the richness of real life data makes
the experience more memorable, but because students approach real
problems with a heightened seriousness of purpose. Research on simulation
gaming shows that students play at academic exercises in ways that
circumscribe their learning. 60 Law school counteracts this phenomenon in
the first year by making class activity lifelike (case analysis is performed in
roughly the same manner as in law practice), 61 and important (first year
grades and the effects they produce place a ceiling on future work options),
but once case analysis is mastered in at least a rudimentary sense, and class
standing is established, there is no equivalent pressure in second- and thirdyear courses, even though there are many subjects still to be understood. A
teacher can be charismatic, or restrict enrollment to mature students, but
putting students in real situations has similar effects and is more easily
attained. As long as such programs are no more costly than their traditional
counterparts, and the outside office program is not, there is no overriding
objection to their use. This is not an argument for the pervasive use of

59. See Condlin, Moral Failure, supra note I. at 323-24. for a discussion of this point.
60. See e.g., Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Bert R. Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and
Negotiation 297-300 (New York, 1975), and discussions cited therein.
61. See Condlin. Moral Failure. supra note I. at 340n. 15.
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clinical fieldwork, only a few clinical subjects are taught best out of real
cases, but for advanced seminars of the type described earlier. 62
Organizing a practice program dispersed throughout many offices might
appear difficult logistically, but this is true only if one is concerned with
using the offices to train students to master skills. If the goals are
understanding and critique, a professor need not monitor student
experience closely. A working familiarity with each student's law firm, an
understanding of the customs of local practice. and the student's experience
captured in some relatively accurate form (such as a text) would be enough.
This data need only be evocative enough to recreate the relevant experience
in the student's mind when it comes time for analysis. There would be no
such thing as a ''teachable moment," lost to posterity if its meaning was not
analyzed the instant it occurred. Critical reflection would occur whenever
the student and professor could meet, and for several reasons it might be
better if this happened well after the student's performance had taken place.
This is an instance in which different instructional goals make for different
logistical concerns.
Periodically, compromises may have to be made in this format to
accommodate structural features of law practice. Clients do not make
themselves available for limited purposes, for example, quietly bowing out
once a student has accumulated enough experience to sustain a period of
critical reflection, and this is true whether one works in an outside office or
a conventional clinic. But these compromises are kept to a minimum when
the clinical professor and student are not solely or even principally
responsible for the representation of the client. With a separate attorney
protecting the client's interests no problem is created when instructional
objectives require the clinical participants' attention elsewhere. This is a
major advantage of the outside office format.63
Lawyers will cooperate with an outside office program for several reasons.
The largest number will help out of a desire to contribute to law student
education. Lawyers are law students once removed, and most can remember
when they too were novices and helped along by members of the profession.
Others will value the opportunity to talk with someone who understands
their problems and can give them a second (and third) opinion on their
work. Graduates or friends of a school will help out of a sense of loyalty,
while others will like the prestige that comes with being affiliated with a

62. See note 6 supra.
63. Not wanting to be embarrassed before one's peers and students cau~es (and should raust•)
conventional clinicians to prepare cases compulsively. In doing so, however. they leave
little time or energy for critical reflection. A sigh of relid is the typtc:al postperlurmanrc
reaction, and searching discussion abour the improvement of performanre is of little
interest at that moment to all but a few genuine saints (with high metabolism rates). (Many
assert that they engage in searching postperformance critique, bm close examination
usually shows their definitions of "searching" to be controversial.) Enrrgy n•tums, of
course, but time does not, so that when interest in critique reemerges then• is more pressing
work on other cases. If clinicians are to do worthwhile critique, at a minimum. tht•v must
be freed from tht:' all-consuming burdens of public pt•rlormann· wlurh gn hand in hand
with client representation.
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university law school, or see students as free (or nearly free) resources with
which to augment their client services. Having to make few adjustments in
their day-to-day ways of doing things will make it easier for lawyers to
accept such a program. Because the lawyers provide data more than
instruction any of these motives is acceptable.
The behavior of cooperating lawyers must be reasonably competent and
the issues raised by their practice moderately complex if outside office work
is to generate interesting critical insights. These requirements may cause
difficulty for schools located in communities where the quality of practice is
not high or the type of work not sophisticated, and in these circumstances
operating a conventional clinic may be the wiser course. Sophisticated
practice does not inevitably mean antitrust or First Amendment work,
however. or cases not likely to be found in small- to medium-sized cities.
Cases can be interpersonally rich even when doctrinally simple. particularly
when examined through the prism of a well-developed conceptual
framework, and interpersonal skill is found in small communities as well as
large. In fact. increased access to skill exemplars and a less-pressured pace in
which to discuss issues can make the small community preferable much of
the time. 64 Clinicians argue that practitioners cannot be trusted to illustrate
skill expertise. and give a dozen or so local examples to support their claim.
When I make the opposite assertion. I also have only a dozen local examples
in mind, but for my claim a dozen examples is proof.
Some may fear that lawyers will resent being thought of as pata and refuse
to cooperate with a program that looks at them in that way. If true, this
would be an important concern for the outside office format because of its
heavy reliance on lawyer cooperation. But the concern need not materialize
if the clinical professor understands and appreciates both his and the
attorney's role. A skilled lawyer has internalized a sophisticated repertoire of
habits, beliefs, motor skills, tacit theories, and practical wisdom that are
indispensable to good law practice and almost impossible to duplicate. A
clinical course must provide access to such expertise or it shortchanges
instrumental concerns and has nothing on which to ground its critical
analysis. Clinicians cannot provide this expertise because typically they do
not possess it and if they do, they cannot be both data and critic. The outside
attorney is the professor's necessary and coequal collaborator, and he must
be viewed in that light.

64. I have taught in clinical practice programs in two small cities (Charlottesville. Virginia.
and Bloomington. Indiana) and on!." large one ( Bos10n. :\lassachusettsl. and found the
small city preferable on almost every count. In small cities judges and lawvers have more
time to spend with students and take it. cases proceed in a more timely fashion. pron·dural
mechanisms are applied as written rather than short-circuited oecause of time and case load
pressures. and clients and witnesses are more accessible and thus available fm more
extensive consultation. There are problems with small city practice. of course. but if
casework is over the sophistication threshold (which is not high-small cases are now
thought the best teaching vehicles even in big cities). they are more manageable problems.
The small communities I have had experienct' with have had at least 50.000 citiLens. Small
town and ruml pmctice seems different. see Donald D. Landon. Clil•nts. Colleagm·s. and
Community: The Shaping of Zt•alous Advocacy in Country Law Practice. 1985 :\mer. Bar.
Found. Rl•s. j. 81 (1985). and may nm be as adapted to clinical practice instrunion.
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The clinician must also recognize that his task is not to pass judgment on
attorney work. He asks why issues are defined, options limited, and choices
made as they are, but these are questions about the profession as much as
any particular attorney, and more important, they are questions. not
competing conceptions of appropriate skill performance advanced
indirectly under the guise of inquiry. The professor is engaged in studying
the profession, not grading it. In fact, patterns that appear problematic to
the professor might well turn out to have more to be said for them than the
professor has surmised. Because he often will lack the attorney's more
extensive knowledge of the situation, the professor will be wrong or at least
incomplete in his analysis a fair amount of the time. In those instances
when specific attorney decisions are properly called into question, the
professor's comments should interest the attorney as much as the student.
Insightful evaluation, if presented badly, can provoke resentment, but this is
a failure of execution, not design. Thinking of the outside attorney as data is
a respectful view and enough lawyers will understand it in that way. Those
who do not usually do not make good clinical supervisors. 65
The outside office program has several further advantages over the
conventional clinic. To begin with, it dqes not make a disproportionate
claim on the limited law school resources of money, credit hours, and
student time, and until it can be shown that there is something special about
the conventional clinic that claim is greedy. I have taught clinical courses in
every credit hour format, from full semester for fifteen credits to three-hour
seminar, and in both conventional and 'outside office settings, and have
found no knockdown arguments for the benefits of the conventional clinic.
Thus, I do not think that such a special factor can be shown to exist. More
important, an outside office program is likely to generate more critical
insight than the conventional clinic because it separates critique and those
who do it (professors) from producing data for critique and those who do it
(lawyers). It is not a problem that a professor sympathizes with a lawyer's
position, in fact this is often helpful, but when the first reaction to a work
product is to defend rather than analyze it {even if unself-consciously) the
professor is not performing effectively as a law teacher. Professors are less
likely to identify emotionally with the decisions being evaluated, their
defenses are less likely to be triggered, and the full range of their critical
insights is more likely to be available for discussion with students when the
work being reviewed is not their own or that of a close colleague.
The outside office structure parallels that of the traditional law
classroom, in which the teacher feels little emotional identification with the
opinion being analyzed. Because clinical teachers and students work with
persons whose decisions they sometimes question, the analogy to the
clas_1;room is not perfect. But these differences can be seen as presenting an
opportunity to teach about learning from colleagues, not a self-evident or

65. See Condlin. Socrates' New Clothes. supra note I. at248-74; and Kreiling, supra note 5, at
300-306, for discussions of the difficulties in this process.
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easy process when done well. 66 Students can record conversations. with
supervising attorneys in which they are both giving and receiving evaluative
comments (the students' 0\'1.-n, it is important that the students not become
mere messengers for professor commentary) and analyze those transcripts
for their "learning-mode" 67 properties. Learning to learn can become part
of the clinical practice instructional agenda. Even here, emotional distance
from the particulars of the conversations under study, even if not complete.
is a valuable quality in the professor's direction of the analysis.
The outside office is also more representative of the so-called real world of
law practice. 68 The caseload and client population are usually more diverse.
presenting a wider choice of analytical problems and personality profiles.
The absence of a captive client market in many of these offices makes the
attorney-client relationship, in Douglas ~osenthal's phrase. more
participatory, though as Rosenthal also shows the freedom to hire someone
else does not always act as a check on lawyer domination. 69 Decisions about
quantity and nature of the work to be done are in the hands of lawyers not
professors, who are likely to give their contracts with diems and the limits
of their resources priority over their agreements to help students learn.
Client goals and limitations on resources are powerful constraints on Ia wyer
learning in all but the conventional clinic and are boundaries within which
students must learn to operate. The differences between an actual law office
and a clinic can be overstated, but they are real differences nonetheless. If it
is possible to live a full, critical life of the mind in the practice of law, it
must be possible and it is certainly necessary to show how this is done in an
actual law office. Students ought to be skeptical of anything les!>. ;o
Ironically, a variation of the outside office format also may be equally
suited for training in practical skills. Two things are necessary to train in
skills: (I) a set of images of excellent performance which can become
standards for evaluating one's own efforts, and (2) the opportunity to
rehearse a skill and review that rehearsal until the motor dimension ol the
skill is under control. Access to elite and senior practitioners allows the
outside office to offer a larger catalogue of excellent skill images and thus
helps students develop more sophisticated standards of practice. Opportunity
66. Having prdctitioners and professors work in teams. in which one mc.>mber takes principal
responsibility for skill judgments and the other for critique, is at least as likrlv to ptoducc
the type of reflective practice proponents of clinic-al education say they want as the present
strategy of trying to make single individuals (whc.>ther lawyer or professor) equallv adept at
both processes. In this respt!ct. the outside office format contains the.> ~eeds of an alternative
conception of law practice that makes it as much a program of strucuual tdorm for tht!
legal profession as a pedagogical innovation. It also provides a befiinning vehidt• to help
law schools exploit the educational potential of part-time work by students.
67. See Condlin. Socrates' New Clothes. supra note I. at 235-42. for a description of "lt·arning
mode" properties.
68. No single office is representative of practice as a whole. and this increases the risk of
overgeneralization. see note 6 supra, but this is a problem principally for clinical programs
• that rely on fieldwork for all of their data.
69. See Rosenthal. supra note 8. at 29-63.
70. cr. Gordon. supra note 39. at 8 (10 impart "professionalism" law school Wlll>•.·s net•d the
example of successful real world lawyers).
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for drill is more difficult to provide, but if the professor is willing to
supplement casework with simulation exercises in the skills under study,
little is lost in the way of improved performance. Because simulation
exercises can be designed, manipulated, and repeated, they are more likely
than casework to develop desired habits, and habit is the foundation of skill.
In fact, it is an illusion to believe that skill proficiency can be acquired in
the semester or year available for the conventional clinic, where drill is and
cannot be continuous. Preparing simulation exercises places more of a
burden on the clinical professor, but that is not an objection to the format.
Because cooperating attorneys will delegate less work tha~ conventional
clinicians the outside office will present fewer opportunities for students to
perform certain types of lawyer tasks (e.g., argument to court, examination
of witnesses, deposition taking, and other publicly performed skills).
Decreased opportunity to perform is traded off for increased opportunity for
critique, however, on the belief that over time critical analysis of early
practice experience pays greater dividends than the experience itself. In an
ideal world an outside office would provide the same practice opportunities
as the conventional clinic, and on occasion it will be possible to find such
offices. But most of the time in establishing a practice program a choice
must be made between creating opportunities for experience and
opportunities for critique, and I suggest that critique be chosen.
Adoption of the outside office format is likely to have effects over both the
long and short term. Over the long term it will encourage more critically
inclined persons to enter clinical teaching. New law teachers will not be
discouraged from choosing clinical subjects by the prospect of running a
law firm or being the attorney of record on a large number of cases. They
will know from the outset that practice responsibilities will not be
mandatory, and to the extent that such responsibilities are chosen, they will
not be so all-encompassing as to prevent teaching in nonpractice formats,
doing research, or writing. In the short term, the model will free existing
clinicians from the impossible burden of being equally adept at both
practice and critique. Some will discover that they prefer practice and
redesign their teaching toward that end, while others will decide the
opposite. Either decision, as long as it is freely made, works to the benefit of
clinical teachers and law schools alike.
The outside office model also provides a framework within which the
clinical efforts of traditional law faculty can be conceptualized and
coordinated. With varying but sometimes great frequency, traditional
teachers offer clinical courses in areas of their substantive expertise.
Arrangements for fieldwork are made on an ad hoc basis, and typically do
not continue beyond the end of the course. Such efforts ought to be
encouraged because they help flesh out a school's clinical curriculum and
involve all of the faculty in the important task of studying lawyer practice
behavior. 71 Many traditional teachers have a good deal to say about lawyer
71. See W. Burleue Carter, Robert Gordon Gives Twemv·Fifth Holmes Lectures: Traces the
Tradition of American Lawyers to Present, 80 Harv. L. Rec. 4-5, 16 (March I. 1985), on the
importance of studying lawyer behavior.

HeinOnline -- 36 J. Legal Educ. 72 1986

The Clinic and Political Critique

73

practices but need a format that does not swallow them up. The
requirements of coverage and coordination suggests that someone ought to
work in the clinical field full-time, but clinical study property conceived is
too important to be left only to clinicians.
Finally, it should be made clear that the outside office format is not a
move backward toward the "apprenticeship'' model of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.7 2 Apprenticeship trivialized practice
instruction by emphasizing mundane information (e.g., where to find the
proper form) and mechanical skills (e.g., arrangement for service of
process). Students were used as mere resources, or often forgotten altogether
for large parts of the time spent in their mentors' offices. Clinical teachers,
as heirs to the apprenticeship tradition, devised the conventional clinic as a
means of avoiding these abuses. The key to intellectual quality control, it
was thought, was to place instruction under the exclusive direction of a fulltime law teacher, and the easiest. in fact. only sure way to do this was to
create a law office within the law school itself. This was a reasonable view
two decades ago, when the content of clinical study was largely undefined
and format was the only thing about which one could be certain. But as that
content has begun to emerge, rigidity about format looks increasingly like a
"compulsory chapel" view. 73 As identity develops, fewer environments are
threatening.
An outside office program is likely to avoid the abuses of apprenticeship
and the so-called farm-out clinics because it locates the teaching function in
a law school professor rather than an attorney, and places emphasis on
critical understanding rather than on acquisition of skill, information, or
lore. The student is judged on his analysis, not performance of lawyer
practices, and experience is important as data. not for its own sake. In the
end, an outside office program embodies the best features of apprenticeship
and the conventional clinic, access to mainstream law practice and
practitioners from one, and full-time law professor instruction from the
other, and combines these features with the critical perspective of the
university at large to form the next logical step in the development of
formats for clinical practice. 74

72. For discussions of apprenticeship see Robert Stevens. Law School: Legal Education in
America from the 1850s to the 1980s 3. 10-11 notes 5, 6 (Chapel Hill. N.C.. 1983); and E.
Gordon Gee 8e Donald W. Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer
Competency, 1977 B.Y.U. L Rev. 695, 722-27. 731-43.
73. See Robert Stevens, Preface, 1977 B.Y.U. L Rev. 689,692-94.
74. An argument for the outside oHice format is not an endorsement of existing clinical
externship, internship. or farm-out practice programs. Most such programs have skills
training as their goal and use the outside omce only to help keep costs down. Since skills
training is the wrong objective for a practice program these programs are misguided from
the start. The key to a successful practice program is a clirtical teacher interested in critical
not instrumental questions, of the sort illustrated earlier in the discussion of the
"snowball" case. See notes 54-56 supra. The outside office format is important, not in
itself, but as the structure most likelv to altract clinicians with critical interests and to
provide adequate opportunity for tho;e interests to be explored.
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IV. Qualifications, Variations, and Problems of Implementation
The foregoing remarks should not be read as an unqualified dismissal of
the conventional clinic. I mean to suggest only that the clinic is not an
indispensable feature of clinical instruction, not that it should never be
used. Schoob that have not yet invested in a clinic may want to think twice
before doing so. but those that have made the investment need not abandon
it. The conventional clinic performs several functions better than the
outside office, and these will remain important functions to perform. To
begin with. a law school. as part of its obligation of good citizenship, could
establish a clinic to provide legal representation to persons or interests that
would otherwise go unrepresented.i5 Instructional benefits from such an
office would be considered desirable but nor essential to its continued
support. Several schools whose clinics predate the clinical education
movement seem to have acted on this motive. and others may have.7 6 This
reason is compelling to many though not all, and a school said to have
established a clinic for such purposes ought to have debated the issue in
those terms.
The remaining functions are connected more directly with instruction.
One involves the situation mentioned earlier in which the quality of local
practice is not high, or the nature of local casework not sophisticated, and a
law school clinic is the best means for providing students with indh•idual
and organizational models of excellent practice. Here, the clinic is chosen
because it is the lesser of all evils. The conventional clinic is also better
suited for those students who need to take their first law practice steps in
smaller increments than outside law firms can economically accommodate.
Such students require smaller than average assignments, regular and
frequent access to supervisors, and supplementary counseling and support.
When ready, however, evP.n these students ought to work in outside office
programs where they can try out newly developed skills and understanding
under conditions more representative of future work settings. 77
A conventional clinic established for the above (or other) reasons, still
should be structured as much as possible along the lines set our in this
discussion. Supervision of lawyering should be separated from critical
analysis (e.g., students should have two supervisors), critique should be
given priority over skills training, and supervision should be approached as
the elaboration of a body of ideas rather than the production of a set of
experiences. Some of these tasks will be difficult to accomplish in the
75. See Bloch, supra note 5, at 322 note 3. and articles cited therein for a discussion of rliniral
education's citizenship obligation.
76. Possibilities with which I am familiar are Harvard. Tennessee, Chicago, Denvrr.
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Boston College, and Georgetown law schools.
77. The conventional clinic is also better suited to the critique of ideology. See note 13 supra.
To transcend ideological constraints professors and students must be both lawyers and
professors and generate data about their simultaneous participation in t•adt rolt·. Tht•
conventional clinic guarantees such data, but the outsidl' office does not. Critique of
ideology is the most advanced form of clinical study. however, and ought to bt• undertaken
only after a student has completed the full cliniral sequence. including tht• outside offit'e
program.
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conventional format but it is better that they be realized partly than not at
all. None detracts from what the conventional clinic would otherwise
contribute to student learning. 7B
The ideas proposed here may encounter some resistance. Students, for
example, may presume that the conventional clinic is superior to the
outside office for two principal reasons. First, for many students working on
live cases is new and exciting, much like being in the first semester of law
school all over again, only better because this time the study is obviously
relevant to law practice. Often, it does not matter that the training is
unsophisticated and uncritical in some larger sense, as it did not matter in
first year that case analysis was often simplistic. What is important is that it
is "real." Critique of lawyer practices may look overly academic by
comparison and come at a time when student tolerance for academic
approaches is low. Second, students may prefer the increased responsibility
for client interests the outside o££ice delegates because they think it is a sign
that they are being treated as adults.7 9 Not respecting student maturity is a
serious law school problem, and students are right to want more adult
treatment than law schools typically provide, but the problem is not solved
by the temporary and limited measure of placing students in clinics. This
uses the clinic as a placebo and leaves the law school social structure
relatively intact. Development of genuine respect for student maturity
requires different measures.
Clinical teachers also make a variation of the "responsibility" argument.
The clinic is the best place to teach responsibility, they say, because being in
charge of a client's case develops character, speeds up maturation, and
reduces the risk of undependable lawyers being lapsed on an unsuspecting
public. To an extent this is true. Taking responsibility is an important part
of learning to be responsible, and work on a client's case is as good a vehicle
for taking responsibility as any. But instruction depends upon format and
expertise, and there is no evidence to indicate that clinical teachers are
expert at understanding or teaching about the process of becoming
responsible. 80 Lawyer skill practice, not maturation, is the clinical subject

78. Law schools also ought to experiment with other clinical practice formats. One with
promise has schools with o££ice space 10 spare renting it-along with rights to the library.
special access to students, and the like, to existing law firms at below market rates in return
for the £irms' agreements to provide clinical practice npportunities and to allow themselves
to be studied. Participating firms could be chosen on the quality o£ their work.
organizational characteristics, subject matter concentrations, or whatever other features a
school wished to draw on in its practice courses. In this model. a firm would maintain its
structure and identity, but operate out of a law school so to speak. This approach has
several advantages, not the least o£ which is that it gives law schools access to more
experienced and elite clinical mentors. Terms of the contract between a school and a firm
would take careful thought, but it is conceivable that the obligations on each side would
not be so onerous as to prevent a££iliation. Such a project is now under way at the
University of Maryland Law School.
79. But see Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note I. at 2·18-74 (illustration o£ how
ostensibly respectful supervisory behavior c-.m in fact be manipulative).
80. For example, in the scholarly literature few if any clinicians draw on or show an awareness
o£ the considerable body o£ psychological and philosophical literature on moral
development.
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matter. and most clinicians go beyond the limits of their competence when
they leave the realm of skill practice behind. Interestingly enough, this
argument, like so many others for clinical instruction. focuses on a
peripheral feature that is part of all law study, traditional and clinical alike.
Such arguments make it seem as if clinical study has no distinct
contribution to make to the study of law, that· there is no discrete body of
ideas which is central to understanding law and specific to the clinical
vantage point.
In addition, students ar~ likely to be more interested in social and
political critique of lawyer practices than they initially realize. Their
impressions of w• 'rking in law firms often are uninspiring because they
have not had the opportunity to interpret or criticize tho!>e impressions in
all the dimensions they associate with good thinking. It is the instrumental.
simplistic, or noncritical nature of their observations which is troublesome.
more often than the subject of law practice itself. Students are surprist•d to
discover the critical side to clinical study but find such analysis 11atisfying
and important once it is understood. When these impressions seep into the
collective consciousness of a student body at large, agitation for conventional
(as opposed to more) clinical instruction usually abates. Thosl' who are
troubled by all forms of authority will continue to see the conventional
clinic as the only work in which they can be their own bosses. but this
concern is not one that law schools will be able or should 'try to relieve. HI
It might be more difficult to persuade clinical teachers of the merits of the
outside office format. Part of the reason, I suspect, is that clinicians are more
often practitioners than scholars or critics of law practice, and are more
interested in training than critique. They have a conception of lawyer skills
to transmit, a tacit belief in the staying power of the present system for
adjudicating disputes, and a desire to inculcate the best-known ways of
manipulating that system. 82 But they are less interested in conceiving of
alternative institutional arrangements or new practice methodologies. This
is more than a concern with perserving a conception of clinical teaching one
knows how to do best. Even the non-self-interested clinician will give
critique a low priority if he believes he can practice successfully without it;
and it is easy for him to believe this. Critique's contributions to practice are
subtle, indirect, and incremental over time, so as not to be easily perceived
by a person preoccupied with other important and pressing tasks. 83 Unless
he values critical understanding for its own sake and is willing to suspend
judgment on its practical value, a clinician will view almost any specific
instance of it as unimportant, and the issue will come up only in specific
instances. Reasoning from this mistaken premise, he will have no cause to
doubt his conclusion and no experience on which to base the opposite
conclusion. He will not discuss this belief publicly because it is not highly

81. A more critical approach to clinical study might also attract top-ranking students. whn now
often avoid clinical courses as too vocational.
82. See note 38 supra.
83. See Simon. supra note 21. at 503 Cmmribution of rritiml theory to pranin· is indin·nJ.
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regarded in the law school ~nvironment. but he will believe in and act on it
nonetheless.
Some clinical teachers once espoused critical objectives but at different
points gave them up to represent clients and run law offices." The prospect of
changing the world for the better through the power of law and law students
was the principal motive. An army of law students marching forth from
clinics, uncorrupted by money or the desire to make it. was seriously
considered to be one of the poor's best hopes. The romantic nature of this
vision may have enhanced its appeal to the former legal services lawyers
who made up most of the cadre of early clinical teachers. For others.
running a law office was a familiar and enjoyable task. and one that was
easier to perform successfully under the often hostile scrutiny of traditional
law faculty. Those who followed this route soon found themselves
managing bureaucracies, but by the time they realized this they had invested
too heavily in their choices to back away (those who wanted to). With this
background. clinical teachers might understandably resist the suggestion
that the conventional clinic is limited in basic ways.
A few clinical programs are structured along the lines described in this
article. They divide lawyering from critique and give critique the highl'r
priority, conceive of the clinical subject as a body of ideas rather than a set of
experiences, and evaluate students not on their performance of lawyer
practices but on their understanding and criticism of them. These programs
are not often defended in these terms, but I suggest that such a defense
would be more coherent and would explain better the aims of the programs.
Persons in charge of such programs will find the arguments to this article
easy to adopt because they have been speaking prose all along.
V. Conclusion
From even this limited discussion it should be apparent that prevailing
conceptions of clinical practice instruction are no longer adequate.
Practicing law is not the same as critically understanding law practice. and
by conflating the two the conventional clinic is likely to produce the worst
of both worlds, routinized practice and self-interested critique. Practice is a
precondition to critique, to be sure, but in an educational setting it must
also be subservient to it, and this is difficult to attain in the conventional
clinic. Some will see this appraisal as unduly negative, and believe that it
stems from a lack of sympathy for clinical instruction in general. This
would be wrong. The development of the practice clinic is a milestone in
the history of American legal education. Beyond its rejuvenation of law
school pedagogy, the clinic called much needed attention to lawyer skill
practice as an independent variable affecting the justice of the legal system.
and created many of the conditions necessary to integrating the study of that
practice with more traditional parts of the study of law. For its contributions.
both realized and inchoate, the clinic is now an enduring part of the story of
legal education, and rightfully so. But as is often the case with potentially
radical reform, momentum weakened before potential was realized and
clinical education as implemented became an instrumental shadow of
clinical education as conceived. The clinical vantage point. a modified .. bad
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man" view that looks at legal norms from the perspective of how they will
be manipulated by lawyers, still has the potential to inform our
understanding of legal theory and law practice at the most sophisticated
levels. But for this potential to be exploited new clinical formats must be
created, ones that provide time for detached critical reflection, and are
concerned with expanding our understanding of what is possible more than
with passing on what is presently known. If this restructuring is not
undertaken, the clinical education becomes trapped in static, instrumental,
and mechanical ·conceptions of law practice, no matter how clever, it will
and should remain at the curricular margin. Clinical study must evolvenot to survive, clinical positions are secure for the foreseeable future-but
because there is still work to be done.
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